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With political changes afoot in both Australia and the United States, it is 
timely to review military regimes and remind ourselves how greatly they 
matter. Section 51(vi) of the Constitution authorises the Commonwealth 
Parliament to legislate with respect to: ‘The naval and military defence of 
the Commonwealth and of the several States and the control of the forces to 
execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth…’ One of the concerns 
in relation to s 51(vi) has been whether this provision supports the 
establishment of military tribunals and, further, whether these tribunals can 
be regarded as exercising judicial power of the Commonwealth and thus be 
regarded as properly constituted courts for the purposes of Ch III of the 
Australian Constitution. The High Court’s 2004 decision in Re Colonel 
Aird; Ex parte Alpert has established that military tribunals and, more 
generally, the military discipline system will be regarded as constitutionally 
valid and a properly constituted court for the purposes of Ch III provided 
that it is applied to conduct which can be regarded as ‘service connected’ 
or invoked for the purposes of enforcing and maintaining discipline among 
the defence forces. This article examines the decision in Aird’s Case and the 
associated ‘service connection’ test as a basis for supporting the 
constitutional validity of the military tribunal system. The concluding 
                                                
∗ BA (Hons), LLB (Hons) Grad Dip Legal Prac, PhD, Lecturer in Law, Griffith University. 
∗∗ BA, LLM, PhD, Associate Professor in Law, Queensland University of Technology.  
We would like to thank Kanchana Kariyawasam for her research assistance. We would also 
like to thank the anonymous referee and the editors of the Deakin Law Review for their 
valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article. 
          DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                              
VOLUME 13 NO 2 
178
section of the article develops some further observations on the newly 
created Australian Military Court. 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The High Court decision in Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert1 in 2004 
indicated that the Court has settled for now on the use of a ‘service 
connection’ test as the appropriate test with which to evaluate whether 
military service tribunals are properly exercising their constitutional 
jurisdiction in accordance with section 51(vi) of the Australian Constitution 
(‘the Constitution’). Section 51(vi) of the Constitution authorises the 
Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with respect to: ‘The naval and 
military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States and the 
control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the 
Commonwealth…’ The issue in relation to section 51(vi) has been whether 
this provision supports the establishment of military tribunals and, further, 
whether these tribunals can be regarded as exercising the judicial power of 
the Commonwealth and thus as properly constituted courts for the purposes 
of Chapter III of the Constitution. The High Court’s decision in Re Colonel 
Aird; Ex parte Alpert has established that military tribunals are 
constitutionally established provided that they deal with conduct which can 
be regarded as ‘service connected’ or are invoked for the purposes of 
enforcing and maintaining discipline among the defence forces. What is 
interesting about this case is that the facts were significantly different from 
those in related previous cases. Hence, the decision represents the 
establishment and testing of new boundaries to the law. What is perhaps 
disappointing is that the view expressed by Deane J in earlier cases failed to 
provide the separation of powers trump-card despite the passionate dissenting 
view of Kirby J which finds him, and ‘not for the first time’ agreeing with 
that approach to so ‘fundamental [a] constitutional question’. The High Court 
split 4:3 in its decision.  
 
 
II PREVIOUS AUSTRALIAN JURISPRUDENCE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND 
COURTS MARTIAL 
 
The use of courts martial and military tribunals as a mechanism for enforcing 
discipline and trying offences among the armed forces has had a long history. 
                                                
1 (2004) 220 CLR 308.  
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From the seventeenth century, military discipline in the British armed forces 
was enforced by military commanders and the more serious offences were 
dealt with by means of courts martial.2 Detailed legislation was enacted in the 
nineteenth century, providing for disciplinary processes in the army and navy 
through the Naval Discipline Act 1866 (Imp) and the Army Act 1881 (Imp).  
 
The issue pertaining to the constitutional validity of military tribunals and 
courts martial and whether they do exercise judicial power was first raised in 
R v Bevan; Ex parte Elias and Gordon3 ─ a case in which two Australian 
seamen in World War II were sentenced to death under the Naval Discipline 
Act, via the instrument of a court martial, for the murder of an Australian 
naval officer. This issue of whether the court martial process constituted a 
proper exercise of judicial power under Chapter III of the Constitution was 
the subject of an appeal and the matter proceeded ultimately to the High 
Court, where Starke J succinctly outlined the issues and law on the matter: 
 
But do they [courts martial/military tribunals] exercise judicial power of the 
Commonwealth? If so, the proceedings are unwarranted in point of law. The 
question depends upon the interpretation of the Constitution and whether 
such courts stand outside the judicial system established under the 
Constitution. The Parliament has power, subject to the Constitution, to make 
laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with 
respect to the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the 
several States and the control of the forces to execute laws of the 
Commonwealth and by sec. 61 of the Constitution the command in chief of 
the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth is vested in the 
Governor-General as the King’s representative.  
 
Under the Constitution of the United States of America the judicial system 
of the United States is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior 
courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish: Cf. 
Australian Constitution, sec. 71. And the judges hold office during good 
behaviour (art. III, sec. 1). Power is conferred upon Congress to provide and 
maintain a navy and to make rules for the government and regulation of the 
land and naval forces (art. 1, sec. 8, clauses 13, 14). The President is 
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States (art. II, sec. 
2, clause 1). And the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be held 
to answer for capital or other infamous crimes unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
whereas the Australian Constitution (sec. 80) provides that the trial on 
                                                
2 For an historical outline of the use of these procedures see Hembury v Chief of General Staff 
(1998) 193 CLR 641, 667 (Kirby J).  
3 (1942) 66 CLR 452. 
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indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by 
jury but there is no exception in cases arising in the land or naval forces as 
in the American Constitution. But the frame of the two Constitutions and 
their provisions, though not identical, are not unlike. The Supreme Court of 
the United States has resolved that courts-martial established under the laws 
of the United States form no part of the judicial system of the United States 
and their proceedings within the limits of their jurisdiction cannot be 
controlled or revised by civil courts. Thus, in Dynes v. Hoover, Mr. Justice 
Wayne, delivering the opinion of the Court, said: – “These provisions show 
that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of 
military and naval offences in the manner then and now practised by 
civilized nations; and that the power to do so is given without any 
connection between it and the 3rd article of the Constitution defining the 
judicial power of the United States; indeed, that the two powers are entirely 
independent of each other” … 
 
In my opinion the same construction should be given to the constitutional 
power contained in sec. 51(vi.) of the Australian Constitution. The scope of 
the defined power is extensive, as is suggested by the decisions of this Court 
(Joseph v. Colonial Treasurer (N.S.W.); Farey v. Burnett), and though the 
power contained in sec. 51(vi.) is subject to the Constitution, still the words 
“naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and the control of the 
forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth,” coupled 
with sec. 69 and the incidental power (sec. 51(xxxix.)) indicate legislative 
provisions special and peculiar to those forces in the way of discipline and 
otherwise, and indeed the Court should incline towards a construction that is 
necessary, not only from a practical, but also from an administrative point of 
view.4  
 
In that case, McTiernan J also saw no reason to doubt that the legislation 
conferring judicial power on courts martial was in accordance with Chapter 
III of the Constitution.  
 
Similarly, in a subsequent decision in R v Cox; Ex parte Smith5 Latham CJ, 
Dixon and Williams JJ held that courts martial could be empowered to hear 
and determine charges against former soldiers who had been discharged from 
the forces on the grounds of misconduct without offending Chapter III of the 
Australian Constitution.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 (1942) 66 CLR 452, 466-8 (notes omitted). 
5 (1945) 71 CLR 1.  
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III THE DEFENCE FORCE DISCIPLINE ACT 1982 (CTH) 
 
The Commonwealth has since enacted the Defence Force Discipline Act 
1982 (Cth). This Act seeks to create a framework of military service tribunals 
to try members of the Australian Defence Force (‘ADF’) for breaches of the 
provisions of the Act.6 According to Stephen Gageler, this framework of 
service tribunals is essentially a continuation of historic United Kingdom 
legislation relating to the discipline of the defence forces.7 The Act produces 
a comprehensive code for the maintenance and the enforcement of discipline 
throughout the three arms of the Australian Defence Force administered by 
these so-called ‘service tribunals’.  
 
The Defence Force Discipline Act covers generally three types of offence. 
The first type of offence is essentially ‘military’ in character and concerns, 
for example, acts related to insubordinate conduct. The second type of 
offence is essentially criminal in nature and relates to acts such as assault and 
the falsification of documents. Finally, the third type of offence is related to 
civilian criminal offences and concerns, specifically, acts such as serious 
assault and fraud. The Act also includes detailed procedural provisions in 
respect of arrest, search and custody and the investigation of service offences, 
as well as provisions establishing a system of appeal and review of 
convictions and punishments.  
 
Part III of the Act creates a series of offences, most of which are specifically 
military in nature. These offences include mutiny, desertion, assault on other 
officers, negligent performance of duty, malingering, and destruction of 
service property. Section 61 of the Act further refers to and brings to bear 
the whole range of criminal offences, such as assault, manslaughter, murder 
and rape, on acts carried out in the Jervis Bay Territory.  
 
It should be noted here that the Jervis Bay Territory is a Territory of the 
Commonwealth of Australia. It was bought by the Commonwealth 
Government in 1915 from the State of New South Wales so that the federal 
capital at Canberra would have access to the sea. In this respect, it was part of 
the Australian Capital Territory until 1989 when the Australian Capital 
Territory achieved self government, after which it became a separate 
                                                
6 For commentaries on the Defence Force Discipline Act 1955 (Cth) see Hyder Gulam ‘An 
Update on Military Discipline ─ the 20th Anniversary of the Defence Force Discipline Act’, 
(2004) 9 Deakin Law Review 227; Richard Tracey ‘The Constitution and Military Justice’ 
(2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 426.  
7 Stephen Gageler ‘Gnawing at File: An Analysis of Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan’ (1990) 20 
University of Western Australian Law Review 47, 48.  
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Territory administered by the Minister for Territories. However, despite this, 
it should be noted that it is still counted as part of the Australian Capital 
Territory for the purpose of the ACT's representation in the Senate. In effect, 
for most purposes, the Jervis Bay Territory is governed under the laws of the 
Australian Capital Territory, by the so-called ‘Jervis Bay Administration’ 
which handles matters normally concerned with local or state government, 
and which provides primary school teachers and Australian Federal Police 
staffing. Residents of Jervis Bay have access to the courts of the Australian 
Capital Territory, but are not separately represented in the Australian Capital 
Territory Legislative Assembly. As noted, section 62 of the Defence Force 
Discipline Act makes all Australian Defence Force members, as well as 
civilian employees, subject to the criminal laws of the Jervis Bay Territory 
regardless of where the offence occurred. This is thus a legal device which 
makes Defence personnel subject to the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) and the criminal law of the Australian Capital Territory 
─ as military law ─ even if the offence is committed outside Australia. 
 
In this respect, then, a member of the defence force or a civilian employee 
situated in the Jervis Bay Territory, who acts or omits to act in a way which 
would constitute a criminal offence in the Jervis Bay Territory, is guilty of a 
serious offence for the purposes of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 
(Cth). If the act was committed on a ship that was in waters immediately 
adjacent to the Jervis Bay Territory then the act will have been committed in 
the Territory and section 62 will pick up and apply all of the ACT laws that 
are applicable to that act. In short then, a wide range of offences has been 
created under section 62 of the Defence Force Discipline Act and this has 
raised the possibility of a serving member not only being subject to 
prosecution under this legislation via a military tribunal but also being 
prosecuted under the criminal jurisdiction of the non-military court system. 
The assault on a superior officer, an offence under section 25 of the Act, is 
one example of a situation where a member of the armed forces may be 
subject to both a court martial and a criminal proceeding in a non-military 
court. (To some extent, section 190(5) deals with this situation by providing 
that an officer who has been convicted or acquitted of an offence under the 
Act through the process of a court martial cannot subsequently be prosecuted 
for a substantially similar offence in a criminal (non-military) court 
proceeding.)  
 
The purpose of the Defence Force Discipline Act is to apply the disciplinary 
provisions contained in the Act to Australian soldiers serving outside of 
Australia. The provisions of the Act can also be activated in Australia during 
peacetime where their operation could reasonably be regarded or understood 
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as substantially serving the purpose of maintaining, as well as enforcing, 
service discipline.8 The Act also applies in relation to activities that might 
constitute war crimes.9 Under the operation of the Defence Force Discipline 
Act, section 3A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), and the Crimes 
(Overseas) Act 1964 (Cth), the criminal law jurisdiction of Jervis Bay is 
extended to certain categories of persons whilst they are in foreign countries 
and this applies, in particular, to war crimes. In this way Australian 
jurisdiction is extended to extraterritorial acts that may potentially constitute 
war crimes (such as acts in relation to prisoners of war) and which would fall 
under international conventions.  
 
The jurisprudence on the Defence Force Discipline Act indicates two 
conflicting or competing approaches to its operation.10 These can be briefly 
summarised as, firstly, a ‘service status’ approach. Under this approach a 
precondition to the exercise of the defence power and the provisions of the 
Defence Force Discipline Act is the requirement that the person charged 
simply be a member of the Australian Defence Force.11 The fact that the 
person is a member of the ADF is a sufficient basis for triggering the 
operation of the Act and automatically makes the accused liable to 
punishment under the Commonwealth Criminal Code 1995 (Cth).12 As John 
Devereux argues, this approach ‘posits that membership simpliciter of an arm 
of the ADF makes one liable to punishment under a military code’.13 Such an 
approach is one particularly favoured in the United States and is evident in 
such Supreme Court decisions as that of Re Solario v United States.14  
 
Under the second, competing ‘service connection’ approach, the degree or 
extent of connection and association between the offence and the functioning 
of the military or defence force is considered. For example, the approach 
takes into account such factors as whether the crime was committed away 
from the military base; whether its commission took place at a location that 
was not under military control; whether there was any connection between 
the defendant’s military duties and the particular commission of the criminal 
act; whether the particular act involved any flouting of military authority; 
                                                
8 Gulam, above n 6, 228.  
9 Gillian Triggs ‘Implementation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court: A 
Quiet Revolution in Australian Law’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 507.  
10 In this particular respect, see John Devereux ‘Discipline Abroad: Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte 
Alpert’ (2004) 23 University of Queensland Law Journal 485.  
11 In an American context, see Re Solario v United States 483 US 435 (1987).  
12 See R A Brown ‘Military Justice in Australia: W(h)ither Away? The Effects of Re Tracey; 
Ex parte Ryan’ (1989) 13 Criminal Law Journal 263, 276. 
13 Devereux, above n 10, 487. 
14 483 US 435 (1987).  
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whether the offence was one, in particular, that should have been prosecuted 
in a civilian court; and whether a civilian court was present and available, in 
which the case could alternatively have been prosecuted.15 
 
 
IV JURISPRUDENCE ON THE DEFENCE FORCE DISCIPLINE 
ACT 1982 (CTH) 
 
The former ‘service status’ approach was particularly reflected in the 
judgment of Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan16 
where their Honours declared that: 
 
It is open to Parliament to provide that any conduct which constitutes a civil 
offence shall constitute a service offence, if committed by a defence 
member…The proscription of that conduct is relevant to the maintenance of 
good order and discipline in the defence forces. The power to proscribe such 
conduct on the part of the defence members is but an instance of 
Parliament’s power to regulate the defence forces and the conduct of the 
members of those forces. In exercising that power it is for Parliament to 
decide what it considers necessary and appropriate for the maintenance of 
good order and discipline in those forces. And Parliament’s decision will 
prevail so long at any rate as the rule which it prescribes is sufficiently 
connected with the regulation of the forces and the good order and 
discipline of defence members.17  
 
In that case, Sergeant Ryan was charged with being absent without leave, 
contrary to section 24 of the Defence Force Discipline Act, as well as of 
falsifying a service document, contrary to section 55 of the Act. The charges 
were referred to the Defence Force Magistrate and it was argued on Sergeant 
Ryan’s behalf that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter on the 
basis that he was not appointed in accordance with the requirement of 
Chapter III of the Australian Constitution. Relying on both Bevan18 and 
Cox,19 however, the High Court accepted that a service tribunal, when trying 
offences under Part III of the Defence Force Discipline Act, had many of the 
characteristics of a court exercising judicial power in accordance with 
                                                
15 All of these factors or characteristics were outlined in the United States decision Relford v. 
United States Disciplinary 401 US 355 (1971) where the application of the ‘service 
connection’ test reached its most influential level. These factors were also considered in 
O’Callahan v. Parker 395 US 258 (1969).  
16 (1989) 166 CLR 518.  
17 (1989) 166 CLR 518, 545.  
18 R v Bevan; Ex parte Elias and Gordon, (1942) 66 CLR 452. 
19 R v Cox; Ex parte Smith, (1945) 71 CLR 1. 
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Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution. Specifically, the Court 
referred to the fact that the accused, Sergeant Ryan, was entitled to legal 
representation; that he had given evidence under oath; and that the hearing 
was undertaken in the presence of the accused. All of these factors, according 
to the High Court, were indicia of a properly constituted court exercising 
judicial power. According to Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ: 
 
If offences against military law can extend no further than is thought 
necessary for the regularity and discipline of the defence forces…this 
limitation would not preclude Parliament from making it an offence against 
military law for a defence member to engage in conduct which amounts to a 
civil offence.20  
 
Their Honours were also mindful of the difficulties that were experienced in 
the United States following the handing down of the decision in O’Callahan 
v Parker.21 In that case it was held that the jurisdiction of a court martial to 
try a member of the armed forces depended upon the offence charged having 
a ‘service connection’. In seeking to apply this test, the United States 
jurisprudence has concerned conflicting decisions that have turned on subtle 
distinctions. For example, a military tribunal might have jurisdiction if the 
offence was committed on the military base but not if it was committed a few 
metres outside the perimeter.22 Similarly, drugs taken off the base in off-duty 
hours might affect the later performance of military duties but service 
tribunals in the United States have been divided on whether or not they had 
jurisdiction to deal with the charges of illicit drug use.23 The uncertainty 
which had developed up to 1987 led the United States Supreme Court in 
Solorio v United States24 to hold that military courts would have the requisite 
jurisdiction if the accused was a member of the armed forces at the time of 
the commission of the offence ─ in other words the Court adopted the 
‘service status’ test as outlined above. Accordingly, mindful of these 
concerns, Brennan and Toohey JJ sought to reconcile our own constitutional 
objectives and declared in Re Tracey that: 
 
There are two sets of constitutional objectives to be reconciled. The first set 
of objectives, detailed by s 51(vi), consists of the defence of the 
Commonwealth and the several States and the control of the armed forces. 
To achieve these objectives, it is appropriate to repose in service authorities 
                                                
20 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 545.  
21 395 US 258 (1969).  
22 Re Solorio v United States 483 US 435 (1987). 
23 See Richard Tracey ‘The Constitution and Military Justice’ (2005) 28 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 426, 431; O’Callahan v. Parker 395 US 258 (1969).  
24 483 US 435 (1987). 
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a broad authority, to be exercised according to the exigencies of the time, 
place and circumstances, to impose discipline on defence members and 
defend civilians. The second set of objectives, dictated both by Ch. III and s 
108 of the Constitution and by the constitutional history we have traced, 
consist [sic] of the recognition of pre-ordinate jurisdiction of the civil rights 
and protection of the civil rights which those courts assure alike to civilians 
and defence civilians who are charged with criminal offences. To achieve 
these objectives civil jurisdiction should be exercised when it can 
conveniently and appropriately be invoked and the jurisdiction of service 
tribunals should not be invoked, except for the purpose of maintaining and 
enforcing service discipline. These two sets of constitutional imperatives 
point to the limits of the valid operation of the Discipline Act. It may not 
impair civil jurisdiction but it may empower service tribunals to maintain or 
enforce discipline. Therefore, proceedings may be brought against a 
defence member or a defence civilian for a service offence if, but only if, 
those proceedings can reasonably be regarded as substantially serving the 
purpose of maintaining or enforcing service discipline.25  
 
These dicta of the judges provide the outlines of a competing test that has 
been used to trigger the operation of the defence power, as well as providing 
a constitutional basis for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction on the part of 
courts martial and military tribunals when enforcing the provisions of the 
Defence Force Discipline Act. This has been termed a ‘service connection’ 
approach. As part of this approach, it has to be shown that the charging of the 
person contributes to, or promotes, military discipline and the effective 
regulation and functioning of the armed forces.26 It was this approach which 
was adopted by Deane J in Re Tracey in holding that the jurisdiction of 
service tribunals would only be constitutionally triggered where they dealt 
with ‘exclusively disciplinary offences’.27 Similarly, Gaudron J held that 
courts martial would not have jurisdiction where the matter could be properly 
dealt with a civil law court.28 In consequence, Sergeant Ryan was convicted 
of the charge of being absent without leave, but was acquitted of the charge 
relating to the falsification of service documents.  
 
In a six to one majority the High Court found that the Defence Force 
Magistrate had the power and the jurisdiction to hear the charges which were 
levelled against Sergeant Ryan. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court 
                                                
25 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 569-70 (emphasis added).  
26 Devereux, above n 10, 487. As Devereux argues: ‘…in order for the Act’s jurisdiction to 
arise in respect of an individual service member, the nature of the transgression with which the 
service member was charged must be such that prosecution and conviction would ensure 
enforcement or maintenance of military discipline.’ 
27 (1989) 166 CLR 518, 591. 
28 Ibid 599. 
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submitted that it was sufficient, to attract the operation of the provisions of 
the Defence Force Discipline Act, that Sergeant Ryan was a member of the 
ADF. Mason CJ, together with Wilson and Dawson JJ, adopted a particularly 
wide approach in this respect. They declared that:  
 
it is not possible to draw a clear and satisfactory line between offences 
committed by defence force members which are of a military character and 
those which are not.29 
 
Their Honours were of the opinion that it was open to Parliament to provide 
that any conduct which constituted a civil offence could also be regarded as a 
service offence if it was committed by a defence member. This was because 
─ according to their Honours ─ the commission of civil offences was, in fact, 
sufficiently connected with the regulation of the forces and the good 
organisation and discipline of defence members.30 The High Court justices 
here would seem to have repudiated the notion of the ‘service connection’ 
test and the requirement for a connection or association between the charging 
of the member of the ADF and the effective regulation and functioning of the 
military. As Devereux argues, according to this approach ‘membership 
simpliciter of an arm of the ADF makes one liable to punishment under a 
Military Code’.31 
 
In an associated context, their Honours also upheld the validity or 
constitutionality of the exercise of judicial power by the tribunal on which the 
Defence Force Magistrate sat ─ even despite the fact that the service tribunal 
was not a Chapter III Court for the purposes of section 71 of the 
Constitution.32 Their Honours held that, although a service tribunal does 
exercise judicial power, it does not exercise the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth. This was particularly so because the power to make laws 
with respect to the defence of the Commonwealth under section 51(vi) of the 
Constitution in fact contained a power to enact a disciplinary code outside of 
Chapter III and to impose on those administering it a duty to act judicially.33 
Such an approach to the nature of service tribunals would in one view be 
                                                
29 Ibid 544. 
30 Ibid 544. See also Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460 at 474-5 per Mason CJ 
and Dawson J.  
31 Devereux, above n 10, 487. 
32 (1989) 166 CLR 518, 545.  
33 Cf Re Nolan (1991) 172 CLR 460 where Brennan and Toohey JJ referred to the ‘apparent 
exception’ (at 479) but only to later insist that ‘there can be no real exception’ and to 
emphasise ‘the imperative of Ch. III of the Constitution that jurisdiction to hear and determine 
charges of officers against a law of the Commonwealth can be vested only in Ch. III courts’: 
(1991) 172 CLR 460, 480. 
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attractive, since it recognises the distinctive nature of defence forces and the 
specific, arguably unique, set of policy considerations that need to be 
engaged with when adjudicating on actions involving members of the forces. 
There are, however, persuasive reasons for caution in this regard. This 
exception to the separation of powers doctrine, as applied to military 
tribunals would therefore seem to be of limited application and operation. As 
Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon comment: 
 
for reasons of practicality and national security, an exception to the 
separation of powers doctrine allows service tribunals to exercise the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth. However, power extends only to the 
minimum degree necessary to enforce military discipline, and no further. 
Thus, in ordinary circumstances service tribunals should only be entitled to 
hear exclusively disciplinary offences... In circumstances of wartime and 
service outside Australia, service tribunals should be able to hear offences 
that are substantially similar or identical to civil offences.34 
 
Despite this, Brennan and Toohey JJ adopted a narrower or more limited 
view of the power or jurisdiction of the Defence Force Magistrate to hear the 
case of Sergeant Ryan. Their Honours, in particular, were not prepared to go 
as far as Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ with regard to the ambit or 
operation of section 51(vi), essentially adopting a more ‘service’ oriented 
approach. For example, at one point they declared that 
 
proceedings may be brought against defence members or a defence civilian 
for a service offence if, but only if, those proceedings can reasonably be 
regarded as substantially serving the purpose of maintaining or enforcing 
service discipline.35 
 
The judgments of the other members of the High Court seemed to be 
consistent with this approach, emphasising the need for the application of the 
Act to promote, in general, military or defence force discipline. Deane J, for 
example, was of the view that jurisdiction could be validly conferred on a 
service tribunal only to the extent that it related to exclusively disciplinary 
offences. According to his Honour: 
 
To ignore the significance of the doctrine or to discount the importance of 
safeguarding the true independence of the judicature on which the doctrine 
                                                
34 Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon ‘Defence of the Indefensible? Realising the Constitutional 
Validity of Military Service Tribunals’ (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 499, 525; see also 
Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon ‘Justice at the Sharp End ─ Improving Australia’s Military 
Justice System’ (2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 396.  
35 (1989) 166 CLR 518, 570.  
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is predicated is to run the risk of undermining, or even subverting, the 
Constitution’s only general guarantee of due process.36 
 
According to Deane J, powers of service tribunals should be limited to the 
necessity for the maintenance and the enforcement of military discipline and 
─ in those cases relating to offences that were committed in peacetime - ‘to 
dealing with exclusively disciplinary offences’.37 As Richard Tracey argues, 
this approach essentially turned on the issue of whether the grant of 
jurisdiction would substantially serve the purpose of maintaining or enforcing 
discipline of the defence forces.38  
 
A similarly narrow or restrictive approach was advocated by Gaudron J, who 
submitted that jurisdiction could only be validly conferred on a service 
tribunal to the extent that it related to charges of service offences that were 
not substantially the same as civil court offences. By this view, the operation 
of the defence power and the Defence Force Discipline Act ought to be 
confined to one that promoted military discipline and, in particular, to the 
effective regulation of the defence force. According to her Honour: 
 
[laws were] reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and adapted 
to the control of the forces when regard is had to what is necessary from a 
practical administrative point of view.39  
 
The High Court’s decision in Re Tracey, therefore, illustrates the competing 
approaches to the operation of the Defence Force Discipline Act and the 
triggering of its jurisdiction under the constitutional defence power. It 
highlights the lack of conceptual clarity in the Court’s approach, so far, to the 
jurisdiction of service tribunals. Of particular note is Deane J’s view of the 
significance of the separation of powers doctrine in the Constitution: which 
he terms ‘the Constitution’s only general guarantee of due process’, and 
which prompts Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon to remark favourably that: 
 
By starting from the position that service tribunals should not be entitled to 
exercise judicial power, and that departure from this position should be 
allowed only in exceptional circumstances, this approach gives due weight 
to the separation of powers doctrine as a safeguard of individual rights.40  
 
                                                
36 Ibid 580.  
37 (1989) 166 CLR 518, 591.  
38 Tracey, above n 23, 435.  
39 (1989) 166 CLR 518, 600. 
40 Mitchell and Voon, above n 34, 519. 
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One important possible explanation for the apparent lack of precision in the 
High Court’s approach to the Act and the defence power over this series of 
cases, though all upheld the use of the power, could be the changing (defence 
or military) circumstances and conditions within which the Court operates 
and the consequent need to retain a degree of flexibility when approaching 
the issue of defence and the Australian Defence Force. As George Williams 
argues when examining High Court approaches to the defence power: 
 
The central High Court doctrine concerning the defence power is that the 
power waxes and wanes. It is a fixed concept with a changing content 
because its scope depends on Australia’s defence needs at any given time… 
The conditions that determine the scope of the power … are factual 
conditions such as … whether Australia is currently at war or facing a real 
or perceived threat of invasion…41 
 
 
V THE ‘SERVICE CONNECTION’ TEST AND ITS ASSOCIATED 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The latter ‘service connection’ approach considers the degree or extent of 
connection and association between the offence and the functioning of the 
military or defence force. For example, it takes into account such factors as 
whether the crime was committed away from the military base; whether its 
commission took place at a location that was not under military control; 
whether there was any connection between the defendant’s military duties 
and the commission of the criminal act; whether the act involved any flouting 
of military authority; whether the offence was one that should have been 
prosecuted in a civilian court; and whether a civilian court was present and 
available in which the case could have been prosecuted.42 Such an approach 
was well summarised by Toohey and Brennan JJ in the High Court decision 
in Re Nolan; Ex parte Young43 where their Honours declared that: 
 
Service discipline is not merely punishment for wrongdoing. It embraces the 
maintenance of standards and morale in the service community of which the 
offender is a member, the preservation of respect for, and the habit of 
                                                
41 George Williams ‘Defence Power’ in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia. South Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2001, 200-1.  
42 All of these factors or characteristics were outlined in the United States decision Relford v 
United States Disciplinary Barracks, Ft Leavenworth 401 US 355 (1971) where the 
application of the ‘service connection’ test reached its most influential level. These factors 
were also considered in O’Callahan v Parker 395 US 258 (1969).  
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obedience to, lawful service authority and the enhancing of efficiency in the 
performance of service functions. Here, the charges are obviously ‘service 
connected’ but this is not the ultimate criterion though it is an important 
element in determining whether proceedings on those charges could 
reasonably be regarded as serving the purpose of maintaining and enforcing 
service discipline.44 
 
The High Court judges’ divergent attitudes to the operation of the defence 
power and the application of disciplinary proceedings to ADF members were 
particularly apparent in Re Nolan; Ex parte Young.45 In that case, a member 
of the Australian Defence Force, Sergeant Young, was charged with 
falsifying a service document in order to receive an amount of pay greater 
than that to which he was entitled. Young contended that the offences 
charged were those more connected with general law and that the Defence 
Force Magistrate did not have the jurisdiction to hear the matter. In 
determining the operation of the Magistrate’s jurisdiction, Mason CJ and 
Dawson J indicated that he had wide powers and gave the proceedings under 
the Defence Force Magistrate a broad operation. Their Honours held that it 
was open to Parliament to provide that any conduct which constitutes a civil 
offence could also be understood as a service offence if it was committed by 
a defence member and could thereby be triable by a service tribunal.46 In 
effect, the fact that the offence applied to a member of the Australian 
Defence Force was sufficient to bring it within the jurisdiction of the 
Magistrate. Thus, their Honours found that the Defence Force Magistrate did 
have jurisdiction to hear the particular charge.  
 
Brennan and Toohey JJ were also in the majority but sought to impose 
limitations on the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. They declared, in particular, 
that jurisdiction was only triggered when it could reasonably be said that the 
maintenance and the enforcement of discipline would be served by charges 
being heard before a service tribunal constituted by a Defence Force 
Magistrate.47 However in Aird, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ considered 
that the offence could be tried in Australia, were it triable by a service 
tribunal. Mitchell and Voon’s insight as to this is, however, that ‘neither 
result necessarily follows’, for 
 
[t]he interests of military effectiveness and true military justice are best 
served by conceding that service tribunals may operate outside Chapter III 
                                                
44 Ibid 489.  
45 Ibid 460. 
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only in exceptional circumstances associated with war or combat, or in the 
absence of a civilian equivalent in Australian law to an offence that is 
necessary for the enforcement of military discipline.48  
 
The approach of Brennan and Toohey JJ would seem closely to approximate 
the ‘service connection’ test and would appear, in fact, to coincide with the 
method adopted (as previously outlined) by both Deane J and Gaudron J in 
the preceding decision in Re Tracey. As Hyder Gulam argues, according to 
this latter, more limited, approach: 
 
The power conferred by s 51(vi) of the Australian Constitution does not 
extend to the making of a law to punish defence members and defence 
civilians for their conduct unless the proceedings taken to punish them can 
be reasonably regarded as substantially serving the purpose of maintaining 
or enforcing service discipline.49 
 
This ‘service connection’ approach was further emphasised and extended in 
the dissenting judgment of Deane J who held that, so far as offences that 
were committed in peacetime were concerned, jurisdiction could be validly 
conferred on a service tribunal only to the extent that it related to what were 
considered to be exclusively disciplinary offences.50 Thus, Deane J sought to 
distinguish between essentially civil offences and those offences which were 
distinctly or characteristically related to the operation of the defence forces. 
According to his Honour: 
 
I have great difficulty with the conclusion of the majority in Re Tracey that, 
if the provisions of the Act validly confer jurisdiction upon service tribunals 
to deal comprehensively with the disciplinary and community aspects of at 
least some service-related offences, the provisions of s 190(3) and (5) are 
not valid to the extent that they deprive State courts of jurisdiction to deal 
with substantially the same offence after the service tribunal has exercised 
that comprehensive jurisdiction.51  
 
Similarly, Gaudron J ─ reflecting her previous views in Re Nolan ─ held that 
jurisdiction could be legitimately conferred on a service tribunal only to the 
extent that it related exclusively to disciplinary offences. Like Deane J, 
Gaudron J highlighted the need to draw a distinction between offences that 
could be enforced or adjudicated on by ordinary Chapter III courts and 
                                                
48 Mitchell and Voon, above n 34 (2005), 412.  
49 Gulam, above n 6, 233-4.  
50 (1991) 172 CLR 460, 491. 
51 Ibid.  
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offences relating to military discipline that could be enforced by military 
tribunals: 
 
In my view, if the power or any part of the power which the Act confers on 
service tribunals is to be seen as outside Ch. III of the Constitution, it must 
be by reason of the character of the law in so far as it creates service 
offences. It cannot be taken outside Ch. III simply because it is a power over 
persons subject to military discipline. Persons in that situation do not, on 
that account, become immune from the operation of the general law. Nor are 
they, on that account, deprived of the protection of the law. Nor can the 
power of service tribunals to hear and determine service offences be taken 
outside Ch. III simply by reason of the events of history. Times change. 
Whatever may have been the situation in earlier times, there is now no 
insuperable difficulty in bringing members of the armed forces stationed in 
Australia before the ordinary courts when questions arise as to the 
consequence, if any, which the general criminal law imposes by reason of 
their conduct in Australia.52  
 
A subsequent decision in which the High Court had cause again to consider 
the defence power and the nature of the jurisdiction of the defence tribunal 
was that of Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley.53 This decision concerned a member of 
the Australian Defence Force, Wing-commander Foley, who was charged 
before a general court martial for appropriating the sum of $24,761.00 from 
the Commonwealth. Foley sought to defend himself against the charges on 
the basis that the charges were similar to those contained in the federal 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and should therefore have have been adjudicated on 
by an ordinary court. Furthermore, he argued that because the general court 
martial was not constituted in accordance with Chapter III of the 
Constitution, it was one that had no power or jurisdiction to exercise the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth. Mason CJ and Dawson J held that a 
general court martial had the necessary jurisdiction to hear a charge against a 
defence member that he had dishonestly appropriated property of the 
Commonwealth.54 They declared that a law applying to an Australian defence 
force member would, in itself, be sufficient as a basis on which to found the 
jurisdiction of the Defence Force Magistrate. Their Honours stated: 
 
Moreover … we accepted the experience of the United States that it is not 
possible to draw a clear and satisfactory line between those offences 
committed by defence members which are of a military character and those 
which are not. We considered that even if offences against military law can 
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extend no further than is thought necessary for the regularity and discipline 
of the defence forces, it was within the power of Parliament to provide that 
any conduct which constitutes a civil offence shall constitute a service 
offence if committed by a defence member.55  
 
Brennan and Toohey JJ reached a similar conclusion regarding the legitimacy 
of the service tribunal’s jurisdiction, but arrived at this finding through more 
restrictive reasoning than that contained in the judgment of Mason CJ and 
Dawson J. Their Honours declared that Parliament did, in fact, have the 
necessary power under section 51(vi) to provide for a trial of offences before 
a court martial, but that Parliament only had that jurisdiction which has as its 
aim the overall purpose of maintaining service discipline. As their Honours 
declared: 
 
The system of discipline required for the proper organization of a defence 
force may, we said, be administered judicially, not as part of the judicature 
enacted under Ch. III, but as part of the organization of the force itself. We 
concluded that the power to make laws with respect to defence contains 
within it the power to enact a disciplinary code standing outside Ch. III and 
to impose upon those administering that code the duty to act judicially. It 
was implicit in the view which we expressed that the trial of service 
offences might be by way of court martial and not by way of trial by jury 
since the former is not a trial on indictment and s. 80 of the Constitution has 
no application.56 
 
Moreover, their Honours, in reiterating the view outlined in Re Nolan; Ex 
parte Young, declared that: 
 
The proscription of that conduct is relevant to the maintenance of good 
order and discipline in the defence forces; so long as the rule prescribed is 
sufficiently connected with the regulation of the defence forces and the good 
order and discipline of members, it will be valid. Indeed, we do not 
understand how it can be suggested that the prescription of a rule of conduct 
to be observed by defence members, when that rule of conduct is required to 
be observed by the general community for the good of society, is not 
sufficiently connected with the regulation of the defence forces and the good 
order and discipline of those forces. Plainly Parliament can take the view 
that what is good for society is good for the regulation of the defence forces 
and can give effect to that view by creating service offences which are 
cumulative upon, rather than in substitution for, civil offences.57 
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They found that the charge of appropriating the sum of Commonwealth 
money did promote service discipline. Such an understanding again reflected 
significant aspects of the ‘service connection’ approach. For example, at one 
point in the judgment their Honours declared that: 
 
In our view the proceedings in question can reasonably be regarded as 
substantially serving the purpose of maintaining or enforcing service 
discipline. The factors leading to that conclusion are as follows. The charge 
involves a misappropriation of ‘service property’ as that term is defined in s 
3(1) of the Act. The T.R.A. scheme giving rise to the charge is a scheme 
administered by the Australian Defence Force for the benefit of defence 
members. The authority for the T.R.A. scheme is to be found in s 58B of the 
Defence Act 1903 (Cth) and the elements of the scheme, in the form of 
INDMAN 0503, constitute a defence instruction (General) which is a 
‘general order’ as defined in s 3(1) of the Act.58  
 
Gaudron J also adopted a similarly restrictive reasoning, holding that 
jurisdiction could be validly conferred on a service tribunal only where it 
related to, or involved, the promotion of military discipline. She argued that 
only where the charge could, in effect, be characterised as a distinctively 
military offence would the jurisdiction of the service tribunal be triggered. 
Her Honour stated: 
 
I have considered afresh whether Parliament can validly authorise service 
tribunals, which plainly are not courts of the kind contemplated by Ch. III of 
the Constitution, to hear and determine charges under the Act in relation to 
acts or omissions which, although called ‘service offences’, are, in essence, 
the same or substantially the same as criminal offences under the general 
law. I remain firmly of the view that persons who are subject to military 
discipline cannot, on that account, be made ‘immune from the operation of 
the general law … or deprived of [its] protection. In particular, they cannot, 
on that account, be deprived of the protection which flows from Ch. III of 
the Constitution.59  
 
In some respects, these above cases were relatively simple and 
straightforward for the High Court since they involved prosecutions of 
members of the Australian Defence Force who were on duty and who were 
purporting to act in the exercise of their duties. Under these circumstances, it 
was relatively easy for the High Court to find that the prosecutions related to 
promoting military defence and discipline. What is more contentious or 
controversial, however, is the situation where a service tribunal seeks to 
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invoke jurisdiction in cases where charges are laid against ADF members 
who are on leave or who are acting in a purely private or personal capacity. 
It was precisely this latter situation which arose for the consideration of the 
Court in the case of Re Colonial Aird; Ex parte Alpert60 which is the subject 
of significant attention below. The differing fact situation in Aird marks out 
its significance jurisprudentially, for as John Devereux writes: 
 
All three prior High Court cases focused on prosecutions of members of the 
ADF, while those members were on duty and were purporting to act in the 
exercise of their duties. The accused in Aird was in an entirely different 
situation. He was a member of the ADF on leave, not purporting to act in 
the exercise of his duties.61  
 
 
VI RE COLONEL AIRD; EX PARTE ALPERT 
 
Aird’s case62 concerned a soldier, Private Alpert, who was in the regular army 
in the Australian Defence Forces and who was deployed to the Royal 
Malaysian Air Force Base at Butterworth in Malaysia. In September 2001 he 
was granted stand down leave for the last week of September. This leave had 
to be taken in the peninsula area of Malaysia, Thailand or Singapore unless 
express prior approval was obtained from the Commanding Officer. 
Accordingly, Private Alpert elected to take that leave in Phuket in Thailand, 
but, while the leave restrictions might indicate a level of military control, he 
entered Thailand on his civilian passport using no form of military 
identification. There was no Status of Forces Agreement with the Kingdom 
of Thailand maintaining Australian jurisdiction over visiting Australian 
service personnel. Therefore by all accounts it was a recreational visit. 
 
It was while Private Alpert was on that recreational leave, during which he 
paid for himself and did not wear uniform or manifest non-civilian 
accoutrements, that he allegedly committed the offence. A woman alleged 
that Private Alpert raped her in the early hours of 29 September 2001 at 
Patong Beach, Phuket. In November 2001, in a subsequent letter to the 
Commanding Officer of the 6th Royal Australian Regiment at the unit’s 
headquarters in Brisbane, the young woman then formally alleged that 
Private Alpert, who was ironically acting as a military prosecutor within the 
Australian Defence Forces at the time, had raped her, and sought details as to 
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the steps that she would need to take to press a charge of rape against Private 
Alpert. 
 
Private Alpert was charged with contravening section 61 of the Defence 
Force Discipline Act which was drafted to incorporate into the Act all of the 
provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). Section 54 of the Crimes Act made 
it an offence for a person to engage in  
 
sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of that other 
person and [knowing] that that other person does not consent or [being] 
reckless as to whether that other person consents, to the sexual intercourse 
….  
 
Section 9 of the Defence Force Discipline Act, furthermore, purported to give 
that Act extra-territorial effect. According to section 9: 
 
The provisions of this Act apply, according to their tenor, both in and 
outside Australia but do not apply in relation to any person outside Australia 
unless that person is a defence member or a defence civilian.  
 
Therefore, the offence provisions that were contained in the Crimes Act and, 
in particular, the offence relating to rape had extra-territorial operation or 
effect. As Richard Tracey observes: 
 
[Section] 61 of the Act picks up and makes applicable to service personnel 
the full panoply of the criminal law as it applies in the Jervis Bay Territory. 
A service member who acts or omits to act such as to commit (anywhere in 
the world) an offence that which would constitute a criminal offence in the 
Jervis Bay Territory, is guilty of a service offence for the purposes of the 
Defence Force Disciplinary Act 1982 (Cth). A very wide range of offences 
were thus created. There was a significant risk that the same act might 
render a service member liable to prosecution in both a service tribunal and 
a civil court for what could be both an offence under the Act and a civilian 
criminal offence.63  
 
Alpert submitted that section 61 of the Defence Force Discipline Act should 
not apply to him as he was neither in uniform nor was he on duty at the time 
of the commission of the offence. He argued that ordinary criminal law 
should be the relevant applicable law and that the service tribunal and 
Defence Force Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the offence as 
constituted under the Defence Force Discipline Act.  
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By a majority of 4:3 the High Court found that the service tribunal had the 
necessary jurisdiction to hear the charge against Alpert in the circumstances 
of the alleged offence. With this decision, despite the narrow majority, the 
High Court would seem to have finally settled on a ‘service connection’ 
approach to the issue of the jurisdiction of service tribunals. Such an 
approach found favour with Gleeson CJ and McHugh, Callinan and Heydon 
JJ. McHugh J, for example, focused on whether the grant of jurisdiction to 
the magistrate under the Defence Force Discipline Act would serve the 
purpose of maintaining or enforcing discipline of the defence forces, thereby 
clearly indicating his support for the ‘service connection’ test. He was of the 
view that significant anti-social conduct, such as the commission of rape and 
sexual assault, ‘would have a direct impact on the morale and discipline of 
the Defence Force’.64 Specifically, he held that the Defence Force Discipline 
Act was required to ensure that crimes of violence, such as rape, were not 
committed within the Australian Defence Force and that discipline was thus 
an important pre-condition for the effective operation of the force: 
 
It is central to a disciplined force that its members are not persons who 
engage in uncontrolled violence. And it need hardly be said that other 
members of the Defence Force will be reluctant to serve with personnel who 
are guilty rape or sexual assault. This may be out of fear for personal safety 
or rejection of such conduct or both.65 
 
Furthermore, McHugh J considered that members of the ADF were 
fundamentally different from private citizens travelling overseas as they 
would be perceived as representatives of the Australian government and this 
was identified as an important factor in determining whether a relevant 
‘service connection’ was established. According to McHugh J:  
 
In determining whether the standards of conduct imposed on Defence Force 
personnel by reference to the legislation of the Australian Capital Territory 
have the potential to maintain and enhance the discipline of the Defence 
Force, an important factor is that, when overseas, they are likely to be 
perceived by the government of the foreign country and members of the 
local population as representatives of the Australian government. In this 
respect, they are different from ordinary Australians who visit a foreign 
country as tourists. It is not to the point that, so far as dress and other 
matters are concerned, they cannot be distinguished from an ordinary 
Australian tourist.66  
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McHugh J was of the view that there were factors which connected the 
accused with his Australian Defence Force service. In particular, he had gone 
to Thailand by virtue of his deployment, he was not a free agent who was 
permitted to take leave wherever he wished, and he was subject to immediate 
recall to his duty at any time: 
 
First he was in Malaysia and thereafter Thailand as a result of his 
deployment by and service with the Australian Defence Force. Indeed, his 
presence in Thailand resulted from his military service because his 
recreation leave arose out of his military service and was no doubt designed 
to ensure that the prosecutor [Private Alpert] would be better able to carry 
out his military duties. Furthermore, he was not a free agent who could visit 
any country that he wished.67  
 
Accordingly, McHugh J concluded that:  
 
I would have thought that it was beyond argument that … the defence power 
extended to making it an offence for a serving member of the armed forces 
to commit the offence of rape while on leave in a foreign country.68 
 
Gleeson CJ and Gummow J agreed with this analysis and with McHugh J’s 
essentially adopting a ‘service connection’ approach. According to Gleeson 
CJ, the imposition of Australian laws on members of the Australian Defence 
Force serving overseas was an entirely legitimate means of promoting the 
Defence Force’s discipline and its effective operation. Gummow J adopted a 
similar perspective. While not explicitly advocating either a ‘service status’ 
or a ‘service connection’ approach he did cite with approval comments that 
were expressed by Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ in Re Tracey, declaring 
that the jurisdiction of service tribunals 
 
will prevail so long at any rate as the rule which it prescribes is sufficiently 
connected with the regulation of the forces and the good order and 
discipline of defence members…69 
 
However, in dissenting from the judgment of the majority, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ adopted a more qualified ‘service connection’ approach. Their 
Honours paid particular attention to the fact that the discipline of the ADF 
would be enhanced by the enforcement of a section of the Act. As their 
Honours remarked: 
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If the test of service connexion is to be applied on the basis that it will be 
satisfied if the acts alleged constitute an undisciplined application of force, 
or conduct that would be regarded as abhorrent by other soldiers, then it is 
difficult to see how any serious crime committed anywhere, including in 
Australia, under any circumstances would not be susceptible to the military 
jurisdiction exclusively. The further consequence would be the denial to the 
soldier and the prosecuting authority of trial by jury. It is sometimes 
overlooked that the prosecuting authority and the community which it 
represents have as great as [sic] and as real an interest in trial by jury as the 
person on trial. We do not, with respect, therefore subscribe to the view that 
to ask the question whether the discipline of the military service will be 
enhanced by a certain measure or course, is to ask the same question as ‘Is 
there a service connexion?’ Any measure for the proscription of any form of 
misconduct has as its end, discipline. If enhancement of discipline is to be 
effectively the only test, there will be very few offences of any kind, 
committed anywhere, in any countries, which will escape the all-enveloping 
net of ‘service connexion’.70 
 
Thus, their Honours would seem to be suggesting that the proper focus 
should be less on service connection and more on whether the discipline of 
the ADF would be enhanced by the enforcement of the section of the Act.71 
In the end, Callinan and Heydon JJ dissented on the application of this test to 
the facts, finding that there was no sufficient association between the actions 
of the service tribunal or magistrate and the promotion of discipline. 
Accordingly, their Honours stated that: 
 
Nothing that the prosecutor was alleged to have done was done under colour 
of any military authority, or was or could have been done because he was a 
member of the Defence Force, or was materially facilitated by reason of his 
membership in it. The alleged offence was totally unconnected with any 
military duty.72 
 
Kirby J also adopted the ‘service connection’ test as the applicable basis on 
which to evaluate the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s action ─ ‘in the absence 
of a wider argument … challenging the validity of the provisions of the Act 
under Ch. III, and in order to refine the point upon which the court now 
divides’.73 In supporting such an approach, Kirby J stated that: 
 
it is my view that unless a service tribunal is established under Ch. III of the 
Constitution it has jurisdiction to deal with an ‘offence’ by a member of the 
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armed forces only if such an ‘offence’ is exclusively disciplinary in 
character or is concerned with a distinct disciplinary aspect of conduct 
constituting an offence against general law.74  
 
In dissenting from the majority and finding that no proper connection could 
be drawn between the offence as charged and the regulation and discipline of 
the defence forces, Kirby J particularly pointed to the fact that Australia was 
at peace at the time and that Private Alpert was not, at the time of the 
commission of the offence, in combat. Further, Kirby J also drew attention to 
the fact that the accused was not in a location where there was no effective 
law. These factors, according to his Honour, all militated against an 
association being established between the offence and the proper or effective 
functioning of the defence forces. As Kirby J stated: 
 
The constitutional position might be different were those circumstances 
different … (2) the issue of constitutional validity is also to be assessed 
upon the basis that Australia is presently at peace. The special needs of the 
ADF in respect of discipline in times of war (or other times when the 
services ‘stand in most urgent need’ of disciplinary powers) were 
inapplicable at the time of the prosecutor’s alleged offence; (3) the offence 
did not occur in the actual theatre of combat or during military, policing or 
peacekeeping operations in which, whether at home or abroad, special needs 
for military discipline might be inherent in the functions of ‘defence’; and 
(4) the case is not one where the accused was in a place outside Australia 
‘beyond the reach of the ordinary criminal law’ or where there is no 
effective law at all…75 
 
Kirby J also made particular reference to important considerations in relation 
to the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, holding that because 
military service tribunals were not Chapter III courts they could only exercise 
jurisdiction on matters that were exclusively concerned with the discipline of 
the ADF: 
 
[I]t is my view that unless a service tribunal is established under Ch. III of 
the Constitution, it has jurisdiction to deal with an ‘offence’ by a member of 
the armed forces only if such an ‘offence’ is exclusively disciplinary in 
character or is concerned with a distinct disciplinary aspect of conduct 
constituting an offence against the general law.76 
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Consequently, his Honour held that there was insufficient connection 
between the offence and the effective regulation and discipline of the military 
to support the jurisdiction of the service tribunal over the charge. Despite 
these dissenting judgments – of Callinan and Heydon JJ, as well as Kirby J - 
the four judges of the majority were of the view that the application of 
section 61 to the circumstances of the soldier was, in fact, a valid exercise of 
the defence power of the Commonwealth. As previously outlined, Gleeson 
CJ, McHugh, Hayne, and Gummow JJ all held that the provision in the 
Defence Force Discipline Act punishing a member of the Australian Defence 
Force for a sexual offence committed while the service member was on leave 
had the purpose of maintaining military discipline. As Gleeson CJ concluded: 
 
[W]hile defence members serving overseas must obey local laws, the 
imposition of minimum standards of behaviour by reference to Australian 
law is a legitimate means of preserving discipline bearing in mind that 
Australian forces might be located in places where there is no government 
or where there is a hostile government… If it is accepted to be a proper 
concern of Parliament to require defence members, when serving overseas, 
to behave according to standards of conduct prescribed by Australian law 
then there is power to impose such requirements generally…77 
 
 
VII CRITIQUE OF AIRD AND THE DEFENCE FORCE 
DISCIPLINE ACT 
 
The case stated for consideration of the full court of the High Court in Re 
Colonel Aird was ‘insofar as s 9 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 
(“DFDA”) purports to apply the provisions of that Act, including s 61 DFDA 
so as to permit the trial by general court martial under the Act of the 
Prosecutor in respect of the alleged offence … is it beyond the legislative 
power of the Commonwealth and, to that extent, invalid?’78 According to 
Tracey, there is now ‘a significant risk that the same act might render the 
service member liable to prosecution in both a service tribunal and a civil 
court for what could be both an offence under the Act and a civilian criminal 
offence.’79 The basis for this contention is that the legitimacy of service 
tribunals to adjudicate on charges against members of the ADF effectively 
constitutes an exception to the provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution 
                                                
77 (2004) 220 CLR 308, 313. 
78 (2004) 220 CLR 308, 309.  
79 Richard Tracey, above n 6, 429. However, in his dissenting judgment, Kirby J agreed with 
Deane J’s approach that the doctrine of the separation of powers meant service tribunals could 
only be given jurisdiction under s 51(vi) to deal with exclusively disciplinary offences.  
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and that this exception must, therefore, be strictly confined or limited to 
matters related to the operation of the ADF.  
 
To overcome this criticism, further limitations would need to be imposed on 
the capacity of the defence power to support provisions of the Defence Force 
Discipline Act which seek to regulate defence members who are on leave or 
who are acting in an essentially private capacity. On this issue, Mitchell and 
Voon advocate, in effect, a ‘two step’ test for delineating the scope of the 
defence power in relation to service tribunals hearing charges against 
members who, at the time of the commission of an offence, are not directly 
involved in military or defence force activities. First, Mitchell and Voon 
(following the approach of the majority in Aird’s case) ask whether: 
 
trying the offence would substantially serve the purpose of maintaining or 
enforcing the discipline of the defence forces. If the answer is no ─ the 
offence falls outside s 51(vi) of the Constitution and should not be tried in a 
service tribunal …80  
 
This first test would seem to be simply a reiteration of the ‘service 
connection’ test that was outlined by the majority in Aird.  
 
Secondly, Mitchell and Voon require that, in order to trigger the operation of 
the defence power and in order to come within its scope, there must be some 
minimum content or substance in the statutory offence or provision of the 
legislation that links it with the defence power, or that delineates it as a 
provision that has been enacted pursuant to the defence power. As the authors 
emphasise, the jurisdiction of service tribunals in these matters, and the 
provisions of the Defence Force Discipline Act allowing them to try defence 
force members, constitute exceptions to the jurisdiction of Chapter III courts. 
Accordingly, so as not to offend the separation of powers principle, there 
needs to be shown in the legislative provisions or jurisdiction of the service 
tribunal some minimum connection or association with the defence force. 
When outlining the second element or aspect of their test the authors state: 
 
Second, adopting the approach of Deane J, we ask whether trying the 
offence would fall within the minimum jurisdiction necessary for service 
tribunals to maintain or enforce military discipline. If not, only a Chapter III 
court may validly try the offence. It is this requirement that stems from 
Chapter III and the doctrine of separation of powers. The exception to the 
separation of powers principle applies to cases that fall within the minimum 
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jurisdiction necessary for military discipline… Our proposed test resolves 
several problems that various justices identified in Re Aird…81 
 
This requirement of a ‘minimum content’ or ‘minimum substance’ of military 
discipline would appear to overcome the problem associated with the 
constitutionality of service tribunals exercising jurisdiction in matters that are 
essentially civil or private law offences. In the context of the facts of Aird, 
whilst the accused soldier was charged with a civil offence ─ that of rape ─ 
and was on leave during the time of the commission of the offence, there was 
little difficulty in establishing a connection or association between this 
offence and the effective regulation and discipline of the military. This was 
because there is a minimum set of standards of conduct of behaviour to 
which serving personnel had to adhere even if they were ‘on leave’ and not 
acting in the line of military duty.  
 
As Hyder Gulam emphasises, the discipline and the morale of the defence 
force are critical to the efficacy of the defence force and thus provide an 
accurate indicator or test of whether there is a sufficient ‘defence’ content in 
the legislation or jurisdiction of the service tribunal: 
 
Morale and discipline of the armed forces are at the heart of military 
effectiveness. Members of the ADF must have a clear understanding of the 
standards of conduct to which they must conform and they must also have 
confidence that the system of justice will operate in a fair and just manner. 
The primary mission of the ADF is to defend Australia’s national interest by 
preparing for and, when necessary, waging war, using coercive and lethal 
force… Military discipline exists for the protection, not the persecution, of 
ADF personnel. Discipline is not the fear of punishment for doing 
something wrong, but faith in the value of doing something right. This 
aspect of military discipline is often misunderstood. A disciplined defence 
force does not mean cowering in fear of the punishment. It means requiring 
personnel who will do the right thing in all situations…82  
 
What remains to be seen, however, is whether the ‘service connection’ test 
can be further extended to other situations, such as those involving military 
reservists, who are not engaged in active full-time service. While the ‘service 
connection’ was successfully applied to the situation of a defence force 
member who was on leave at the time of the commission of the offence in 
Aird, it is unclear whether it will be applicable to the situation of army 
reservists. As John Devereux argues: 
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2008                                                                          Triggering the Defence Power 205 
What is the service connection test which applies to reservists not 
undertaking continuous full time service? What if the accused in Aird had 
been a reservist? Defining the scope of the service connection test for 
reservists may have enormous consequences in defence.83  
 
In this context too it is worth noting the extensive attention paid by Mitchell 
and Voon to the international comparative situation vis-à-vis conflict between 
separation of powers doctrines, individual rights and maintenance of an 
effective defence force. Besides the examples of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Sweden, they cite Black J in the United States Supreme Court 
who observed in Toth v Quarles: ‘free countries of the world have tried to 
restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely 
essential to maintaining military discipline among troops in active service.’84 
 
 
VIII CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to canvass the relatively recent jurisprudence relating 
to the Defence Force Discipline Act 1955 (Cth) as well as to analyse critically 
the provisions of the Act itself. As has been shown, there have been two 
predominant tests that have sought to ground the constitutionality of the 
provisions of the Defence Force Discipline Act and their application to acts 
by members of the ADF. The first test has been the so-called ‘service status’ 
approach which essentially regarded the fact that the accused was a member 
of the defence force as a sufficient connection for the triggering of the 
jurisdiction of the Act and the federal defence constitutional power. The 
second test, and the one that has received approval by a majority of the 
present High Court, has been the ‘service connection’ approach which 
requires that the provisions of the Defence Force Discipline Act contribute to, 
or promote, the effective discipline and functioning of the military. As we 
have attempted to show here, the Australian case law on the Defence Force 
Discipline Act over the past two decades has reflected, in various degrees, 
elements of both these approaches. The High Court’s decisions in Re Tracey 
and Re Nolan, for example, particularly reflected the divergent approaches 
which the individual justices have taken to assessing the validity of the Act 
and the constitutionality of the exercise of jurisdiction by military tribunals 
and other courts martial. In Re Tracey, in particular, Mason CJ, along with 
Wilson and Dawson JJ would seem to have adopted a particularly wide 
approach, finding that it was sufficient that the person charged was a member 
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of the defence force to trigger the jurisdiction of the Act and of the Defence 
Force Magistrate. On the other hand, Brennan and Toohey JJ, as well as 
Deane J in Re Tracey required a more definite connection or association 
between the offence charged and the ADF, thereby advocating the adoption 
of a ‘service connection’ test. As was shown, this division was further 
reflected in the subsequent decision in Re Nolan; Ex parte Young wherein 
Mason CJ and Dawson J adopted a ‘service status’ test while Brennan and 
Toohey JJ, as well as Deane J and Gaudron J embraced a ‘service 
connection’ test.  
 
The High Court, however, now seems, in its judgment in Aird’s case, albeit 
by a 4:3 majority, to have settled on the use of the ‘service connection’ test. 
As has been shown, however, the use or employment of this test by a 
majority of the Court in Aird has not been without criticism. One criticism 
has been that the test allows service tribunals to prosecute criminal cases 
which have little or nothing that is particularly related to the defence forces or 
military. It has been argued that the exercise of jurisdiction by service 
tribunals breaches the separation of powers doctrine and is unconstitutional 
since service tribunals are not Chapter III courts and are not exercising power 
in relation to distinctively defence or military matters. As a result of this, 
Mitchell and Voon suggested a modification of the ‘service connection’ test 
(as outlined by the High Court) through the insertion of an additional 
‘minimum content’ requirement in relation to defence matters in order to 
trigger the operation of the defence power. Yet, as we have shown, this 
further requirement adds little to the ‘service connection’ test and proof that 
the offence prejudices the discipline and effective functioning of the ADF 
would seem to be a sufficient basis on which to trigger the jurisdiction of the 
service tribunal and the operation of the defence power. It is still unclear, 
however, whether the ‘service connection’ test will operate as effectively in 
those cases involving military reservists who are not full-time serving 
members of the ADF.  
 
Furthermore, recommendations of the Senate, Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Reference Committee have been adopted, and much of this complexity 
may be avoided in the future. Recommendations from this committee 
advocated the establishment of a Permanent Military Court to enforce and 
apply the provisions of the Defence Force Discipline Act. What is significant 
is that the Court is to have all of the associated trappings of a properly 
constituted Chapter III court. The judges of this court, for example, will have 
tenure and they will be entirely independent of the defence force. With the 
establishment of the Military Court, much of the debate about whether the 
‘service status’ test or ‘service connection’ test is most appropriate in 
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triggering the constitutional defence power and the jurisdiction of courts 
martial and defence tribunals will no longer be so imperative. The 
jurisprudence to date will, however, stand as a reminder of the extent to 
which military matters, and, in particular, the  appropriate scope of the 
defence power in times of both war and peace, remain essentially contested 
and subject to ongoing academic debate and judicial contention and 
controversy. Such reflections could pivot around Kirby J’s views as he 
approaches retirement, including his warning that the extension of 
jurisdiction into ‘non-service related’ offences, including that of rape, pushes 
‘the boundary of service discipline beyond its constitutional limits’ and 
would effectively render the requirements of connection to some aspects of 
national defence meaningless.85 Each time the High Court has considered the 
issue of validity of military service tribunals it has upheld their validity ‘to 
conduct trials and impose punishment’ as pertinent exercises of the defence 
power.86 It is timely to conclude with the resounding reflection upon the 
scope of the defence power by Kirby J in Aird, where he reminds us that 
‘[t]he Constitution is a living document. It adapts and changes with the 
changing circumstances of Australia and the world to which it must apply.’87  
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